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Patrilocal Exogamy as a Monitoring Mechanism : How Inheritance and Residence Patterns 
Co-evolve 
 
Abstract 
Economists have modeled inheritance norms assuming the pattern of post-marital residence is 
exogenous.  We model the co-evolution of these two institutions, examining how patrilineal 
inheritance and patrilocal exogamy  reinforced each other in a patrilineal-patrilocal equilibrium. 
We also derive conditions for a matrilineal-matrilocal equilibrium. The endogenous choice of 
the old to monitor the sexual behavior of the young women who reside with them, thereby 
affecting the paternity confidence of the young women’s husbands and hence their incentives, is 
crucial. Our model fits the data on the relationship between inheritance, residence patterns and 
paternity confidence, and on the importance of paternity uncertainty. 
 
 
Sed quis custodiet ipsos custodes? (D Juvenal 1895, Liber secundus, Satura VI, 325, 
lines 347-8.) 
 
1. Introduction 
Recent economics literature has stressed the role of institutions in shaping development. A 
concurrent theme has been to “endogenize” institutions, delving deeper into how and why a 
particular institution might have emerged in a particular society, and why different societies may 
have evolved different institutional arrangements. The institutions I focus on pertain to norms 
regarding residence and inheritance: while most societies developed a patrilineal inheritance 
system – bequests running through the male line – along with “patrilocal exogamy” – daughters-
in-law moving in with their husbands’ families, while sons stayed on in their natal families – 
there were some that developed a matrilineal and matrilocal system (inheritance through the 
female line, with women staying on in their dotal families, along with their husbands).1  
While some economists have tried to explain the dominance of patrilineal inheritance (eg.  
Botticini and Siow, 2003), they take patrilocal exogamy as exogenous. I try to simultaneously 
endogenize inheritance and residential arrangements: I analyze the question of why patrilineality 
                                                 
1 Evidence on this is presented later in the paper. 
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and patrilocality co-evolved and reinforced each other in equilibrium as well as the conditions 
for the emergence of an alternative equilibrium in which matrilineality and matrilocality would 
co-evolve.  As far as I am aware, this is the first attempt to model these twin issues.   
I develop an intergenerational game, which yields a patrilineal-patrilocal equilibrium (PPE 
hereafter) under one set of conditions, and a matrilineal-matrilocal equilibrium (MME) under 
another. My model, thus, can be viewed as providing the missing piece in models like Botticini 
and Siow’s by endogenizing patrilocal exogamy, an institution that is crucial for these models.  
Anthropological evidence suggests a link between inheritance, residence and the extent of 
paternity confidence. However there is no theory explaining these relationships. I make this 
connection explicit in a formal model. In my model, parents and grandparents2 care whether a 
child to whom they leave their property actually shares their genes. Paternity uncertainty has 
received surprisingly little attention in economic models; the few papers I am aware of (Doepke 
and Tertilt (2009), Edlund (2005,2006)) that mention it are in completely different contexts.3 
I now briefly discuss other economists’ hypotheses about patrilocal exogamy. Rosenzweig 
and Wolpin (1985) have a model where “insiders” – people brought up on a plot of land since 
childhood – have an inherent productivity advantage over outsiders, deriving from knowledge of 
plot-specific characteristics. While they did not seek to explain patrilocal exogamy, their idea of 
an “insider productivity advantage”, when combined with some ideas from other economists (eg 
Boserup (1970)) on factors affecting relative productivity across the sexes, can be used to 
generate a simple model of patrilocal exogamy (I develop such a model in a longer working 
paper version of this paper, available on request). However, unlike my main model, this 
alternative explanation cannot explain the fact that men in matrilocal societies had low paternity 
confidence, and directed their investments towards matrilineal kin, while men in patrilocal 
societies had relatively high paternity confidence. It also hinges on the somewhat questionable 
assumption of an insider productivity advantage4 – an assumption which I do not require for my 
model. Edlund (2001), speculating on the causes of patrilocal exogamy, mentions the need to 
locate multiple women within a husband’s household in a polygynous setup. However, unlike 
                                                 
2 Not of the couple but of their children! 
3 I present a large amount of evidence showing the importance of paternity uncertainty as a factor motivating 
putative fathers and other paternal kin. 
4 An insider productivity advantage implies that a son would be more productive on a piece of land than would a 
son-in-law, an “outsider”. However, marriages often occurred between people in nearby villages. It seems 
implausible that plot characteristics would differ sufficiently across nearby plots to significantly and systematically 
affect a son’s and a son-in-law’s relative productivity. 
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my model, this explanation would not address the wide prevalence of patrilocal exogamy in 
primarily monogamous societies. Nor would it explain why some other societies developed a 
matrilocal and matrilineal system. 
The novel features of this paper are as follows. While other economists postulate reasons 
either for patrilineal inheritance (Botticini and Siow) or patrilocal exogamy (Edlund), I visualize 
inheritance and post-marital residence as mutually reinforcing institutions, and build a model 
where they co-evolve. Secondly, I investigate why different societies develop different 
combinations of these norms: why most, but not all, are patrilocal-patrilineal? Thirdly, I explain 
lower paternity confidence in matrilocal-matrilineal societies and make this a part of my model.  
The endogenous choice of the older generation to monitor the sexual behavior of the young 
women who reside with them plays a role in the model, affecting the incentives of the women’s 
husbands to supply productive effort on the family farm. Prima facie, it is not obvious why men 
in matrilocal societies should have lower paternity confidence, however. An old couple in a 
matrilocal society live with their daughter and son-in-law, and if they do not monitor their 
daughter they run the risk of alienating their son-in-law, adversely affecting his productive 
incentives. My model sheds light on such puzzles. 
My plan for the rest of the paper is as follows. Section 2 lays out some empirical 
observations – as well as theoretical work - motivating my research. I partially survey some 
pertinent literature, with a separate sub-section devoted to evidence that “paternity confidence” is 
a major influence on fathers’ and other paternal relatives’ willingness to direct resources towards 
a child. Section 3 lays out my model, specifying the assumptions and timing of the game. Section 
4 solves this game by backward induction and defines and fully characterizes the equilibria, 
presenting my main results. Section 5 discusses my main results  and an alternative explanation 
(modelled in an appendix). Section 6 concludes. The appendix contains a refinement of my 
model with alternative assumptions about the timing of moves, and some additional data. 
 
2.  Motivation and Some Related Literature 
2.1 Motivation : Theory and Evidence 
Although no papers that I am aware of  model the co-evolution of inheritance and residence, 
related work by economists includes Botticini and Siow (2003) who examine why bequests were 
primarily patrilineal. Botticini and Siow, who take patrilocal exogamy as exogenous, reason that 
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patrilineal inheritance was necessary to maintain the son’s incentives to exert effort on the family 
farm. Had the farm been willed to his sister, who lived away from home (given patrilocal 
exogamy) and therefore suffered a comparative disadvantage in cultivating the plot, the son 
would no longer be the sole residual claimant of any improvements in productivity achieved 
through his efforts. His incentives would be dampened. Patrilocal exogamy is thus crucial to this 
model, but is treated as exogenous. Part of our objective in this paper is to address this gap. 
In spite of substantial differences between my model and Botticini and Siow’s, I retain the 
idea that bequests influence the young’s incentive to work. However, I feel that residence and 
inheritance cannot be viewed in isolation from each other. My decision to focus on the co-
evolution of inheritance and residence patterns is further motivated by the fact that most cultures 
with patrilineal descent5 involve the wife moving to the husband’s family at marriage – 
generating a strong relationship between patrilineality and patrilocal exogamy (or patrilocality). 
Conversely, most cultures with matrilineal descent involve the husband moving to the wife’s 
family at marriage – so that matrilineality and matrilocality are closely associated. This is seen in 
Table 1 below which presents our own cross-tabulations based on the Murdock and White 
Standard Cross-Cultural Sample (SCCS) – a controlled sample of world cultures from 
Murdock’s Ethnographic Atlas corrected for regional diffusion effects and auto-correlations. 
Table 1 
Descent Patrilineal Duolateral Matrilineal Quasi-
lineages 
Ambilineal Bilateral Totals 
Residence 
Transfer 
at 
Marriage 
       
Unknown 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
Wife to 
Husband’s  
66 7 3 5 6 30 117 
Optional 
for 
4 0 2 1 0 21 28 
                                                 
5 “Descent” encompasses both lineage and inheritance. 
 5
Couple 
Husband 
to Wife’s  
2 1 24 0 0 12 39 
No 
Common 
Residence 
0 0 1 0 0 0 1 
Totals 72 8 30 6 6 64 186 
 
Source : Author’s calculations based on data available at http://lucy.ukc.ac.uk/cgi-bin/uncgi/Ethnoatlas/atlas.vopts. 
 
Table 1 also makes it evident that patrilocal exogamy  was very widely prevalent.6 
 While observation of an association between descent and residence motivated our 
decision to focus on a co-evolution of patrilineality and patrilocality, and of matrilineality and 
matrilocality, there has also been evidence (Gaulin and Schlegel 1980) of a strong significant 
relationship between residence and “paternity confidence”. Gaulin and Schlegel code cultures 
with a “paternity confidence” variable based on the degree of women’s sexual freedom 
(indicated for instance by the presence or absence of a double standard regarding extramarital 
affairs, the incidence of extramarital sex among women or of wife sharing). They find that the 
strongest predictor of paternity confidence is residential pattern, with significantly lower 
paternity confidence in matrilocal cultures.7 They also found that important offices (such as that 
of headman) tended to be inherited by patrilocal kin in high paternity confidence cultures but by 
matrilocal kin in low confidence cultures. Thus there was a strong association between 
inheritance patterns, residence patterns and paternity confidence. 
Grandparents as Monitors? 
 This motivates us to examine the issue of paternity confidence as a variable influencing 
the co-evolution of inheritance and residential patterns. In my model, paternity confidence is also 
endogenous. It depends on the level of monitoring (also endogenously determined) of a wife’s 
sexual behavior by the older generation with whom a couple lives. Intuitively, in a patrilocal-
                                                 
6 “Bilateral” descent means that both paternal and maternal kin were equally important for ties and inheritance. Note 
that such cultures could be either patrilocal or matrilocal. 
7 For some numbers, readers are referred to Appendix Table 1, based on data in Table 2 of Gaulin and Schlegel 
(1980). 
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patrilineal arrangement, (putative) fathers and paternal grandparents share an interest in the 
wife’s being monitored. If she is not, both must face the fact that the child who inherits their 
property may not be a genetic descendant. However, in a matrilocal-matrilineal arrangement, a 
daughter continues to live with her own parents, who have scant incentive to monitor her, as 
maternity uncertainty is never a factor: the property will be inherited by the daughter’s children, 
who obviously share her genes. Sons-in-law, of course, will be less than happy with the 
arrangement:  their interests conflict sharply with their parents-in-law’s. However, where women 
are the prime economic contributors, the son-in-law’s dissatisfaction may not be important. 
Why can the older generation monitor a co-resident young woman’s behavior more 
effectively than her husband? The reason is the division of labor between the generations. Only 
the young can supply productive effort on a farm. In a patrilocal society, young men (sons) work 
on the land in equilibrium, while the old have leisure which they can (if they wish) use to 
monitor co-resident young women. In a matrilocal society, although young men need not work 
the land, they may suffer a disadvantage relative to their wife’s parents as far as monitoring is 
concerned, either because they are often away fighting wars or are not fully co-resident. Just as 
in a patrilocal society, the old have leisure as they neither supply effort on the land nor fight 
wars, and can, if they choose, use this to monitor. Meanwhile, I assume that even if grandparents 
do not monitor at all, a husband still has some paternity confidence generated partly by his own 
monitoring activities,8 which the grandparents may supplement, if they choose. 
When is the young woman’s production incentive more important than a young man’s? That 
depends on the relative productivity of the sexes. I follow Boserup (1970) : Boserup describes 
how sparsely populated regions relied on hoe cultivation, where women did the bulk of the work, 
while regions with moderate to high population density developed a system based on ploughing 
and domestication of draught animals, where men had an advantage. Thus I treat population 
density as an exogenous parameter influencing relative productivity across sexes. I also draw on 
research by Ember and Ember (1971). They find that matrilocality emerges as the dominant 
residence pattern in societies with a significant threat of “external warfare” – which required men 
to be away for long periods of time, hampering their ability to contribute to subsistence 
production. Women in these cultures became the primary economic contributors. In contrast, if 
warfare threats are either local or intermittent, men can continue to tend their plots even while 
                                                 
8 Of course, it may also be a product of other factors, such as faith in the marital relationship. 
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fending off enemies, and patrilocality is more common. Thus the nature of war threats faced by a 
society is also a parameter influencing which sex is effectively more productive. 
Other economists have posited (but not modeled) other possible reasons for patrilocal 
exogamy – though unlike us, they have not focused on the co-evolution of patrilineality and 
patrilocality, or of matrilineality and matrilocality. Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1985), drawing 
attention to the lack of well-established external land markets in most primarily agrarian 
societies, hypothesize that the reason for land being passed on within a family from father to son 
may reflect an inherent “insider” productivity advantage deriving from childhood familiarity 
with plot-specific characteristics. While I do not make any such assumption in my main model, I 
have a simple model in a working paper version which uses this idea.  The main model therefore 
has the advantage of not requiring the assumption that individuals of the same sex and capability 
are systematically less productive on others’ plots than they would be on their own – an 
assumption which may become restrictive when applied to regions with limited plot 
heterogeneity. Also, unlike a Rosenzweig-Wolpin type model, mine has the advantage of being 
able to explain the link between residence, inheritance and paternity confidence. Edlund (2001) 
contains a brief discussion of possible reasons for patrilocal residence - she posits that 
patrilocality was either based on a greater productive role for the son or that it originated in 
polygyny which made it easier for multiple women to locate themselves in the husband’s home. 
She also speculates that it might reflect the greater bargaining power of men. My model, in 
contrast, explains the widespread emergence of patrilocal exogamy in primarily monogamous 
societies while addressing the co-evolution of matrilineality and matrilocality in certain societies 
and examining the role of paternity uncertainty. 
Other economics literature which mentions paternity confidence is fairly limited. Among the 
papers I am aware of, Doepke and Tertilt (2009) model the evolution of women’s rights 
assuming that women place a greater weight on children’s welfare than men do, and they 
mention paternity uncertainty as one possible reason for this. Some of Edlund’s papers (2005, 
2006) emphasize “paternity presumption” – the legal presumption that a woman’s husband is the 
presumed father of her child. These papers usually model marriage as a transfer of custodial 
rights from a woman to her husband, and a man is assumed to care about presumed, rather than 
true, paternity. In contrast, I do not focus on a father’s rights over a child as defined by (modern) 
law. Instead, I focus on the evolution of inheritance and residence norms – an evolution 
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completely independent of formal institutions like the law – and models men (and their parents) 
as caring about a child’s true, rather than presumed, paternity. 
Other literature on matrilineal and patriarchal societies includes Gneezy, Leonard and List 
(2009) who show that women in matrilineal societies compete more often than men while the 
opposite holds in patriarchal societies. There is a substantial literature on monogamy versus 
polygamy, and an even larger one on marriage payments (dowry or brideprice): some studies 
such as Bergstrom (1994) or Tertilt (2002) combine the two. However, I do not discuss this 
literature in any detail: since I abstract both from polygyny and from an analysis of dowry or 
brideprice, the literature has limited relevance to my  model. 
I now present evidence that people prefer ‘descendants’ who share their genes. 
2.2 Evidence for the “Genetic” Assumption 
Evolutionary biology provides the logic for the assumption that genetic descendants are 
prized over others: natural selection favors individuals who direct scarce resources to those who 
share their genes, and away from competing claimants (a pattern of behavior biologists term 
“nepotism”). I now cite empirical or experimental evidence for this assumption from biologists, 
anthropologists, psychologists and the occasional economist. I first cite evidence of parental 
preference for children who share their genes – as opposed to those who may not or those who 
clearly do not – and then turn to similar evidence for other kin including grandparents. 
 Alexander (1974) provides evidence that paternal care and investment in putative 
offspring varies directly with paternity confidence across different species of males – primates as 
well as humans. Paternal care is highest among monogamous species of forest-dwelling 
arboreals , and lowest among species which live in large groups with multiple males (and where 
therefore other males have access to any individual male’s partner). In human societies, he notes 
that in cultures with traditionally low paternity confidence (where for instance wives lived in 
their dotal homes with their own parents or siblings, rather than in the husband’s home) men 
directed investment towards their sisters’, rather than their wives’, children. He attributes this to 
the certain knowledge that a man must share some genes with his sister’s children (since he and 
his sister undoubtedly have the same mother, and his sister’s maternity of her children is also 
unambiguous) while he only shares genes with his wife’s children if he really is their father. 
Daly, Wilson and Weghorst (1982) mention similar behavior among the Masai, who had low 
paternity confidence due to traditions of wife-sharing, and among Naskapi-Montagnais men 
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(citing historical accounts like LeJeune (1634)).  Gaulin and Schlegel (1980) document a similar 
practice in the Trobriand Islands, where women have great sexual freedom. They note that, 
despite their often affectionate relationships with their wives’ children, men prefer to invest in 
their sisters’ children – a genetically sound strategy.  Moreover, many men in these cultures 
explicitly mention low paternity confidence as the reason for their investment strategy. Anderson 
et al (2007) finds that men doubtful about the paternity of their children spend less time with the 
children, are less involved in their education and are more likely to divorce their wives.  
The importance of paternal uncertainty is also emphasized by empirical studies regarding 
mate guarding among men (Buss 2002), and male jealousy and the sexual double standard (Daly, 
Wilson and Weghorst (1982), Shackelford, Buss and Bennett (2002)). Shackelford et al show 
that though a partner’s infidelity upsets both sexes, men react more adversely to the sexual aspect 
of infidelity – with its implication of potential paternity uncertainty. Daly et al bolster this with 
evidence on spousal abuse and homicides. Gaulin and Schlegel (1980) and Hartung (1985) show 
that rules of inheritance are influenced by paternity confidence – inheritance is more likely to be 
patrilineal (through the male line) in cultures of high paternity confidence (Gaulin and Schlegel 
coded cultures as having high or low paternity confidence depending on the presence or absence 
of a sexual double standard, the incidence of extramarital affairs among women and the presence 
or absence of wife sharing). Daly and Wilson (1982) using data from videos of live births in the 
U.S, as well as data from surveys, find evidence of the overwhelming importance placed on 
paternal resemblance for newborn infants: almost all mothers in their data claimed that the infant 
resembled the (putative) father while hardly any emphasized the infant’s resemblance to herself 
(or to other maternal relatives). Moreover the mothers repeatedly emphasized to the putative 
fathers how much the infant resembled them (the fathers). The authors interpret this as a (mostly 
subconscious, and in some cases conscious) ploy on the mothers’ part to boost paternity 
confidence in their partners, thereby encouraging the putative father to invest in the child. 
In fact evidence on the importance to men of investing in a child who physically resembles 
them – as opposed to one who does not – extends even to non-biological children. Volk and 
Quinsey (2002) find that male adoption choices between several possible children are heavily 
influenced by which child resembles them (while females are not similarly affected). This 
happens at a subconscious level – the men were not consciously aware of the resemblance 
(which was artificially generated by experimenters who morphed their faces with the children’s) 
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and may be interpreted as further evidence for the innate drive to invest in one’s kin (a physical 
resemblance providing a cue to genetic closeness to which men may be programmed to respond). 
Similarly Platek et al (2002, 2003) find experimentally that in addition to being more influenced 
than women by physical resemblance in adoption choices, men were more likely to want to 
spend time or money on children who resemble them, and less likely to punish such children. 
The issue of whether a step child is treated the same way as a biological child is an issue 
rather different from the one that is our concern: we focus on the importance of paternity 
confidence and this applies to men who are uncertain (in the absence, in our model, of some one 
“monitoring” their wives) whether their putative children really are their own. A step parent, 
however, is some one who knowingly agrees to care for a child who he or she knows is non-
biological, driven by “mating effort” directed towards the child’s parent. Nonetheless, evidence 
exists (Case et al (1999), Wilson and Daly (1987), Daly and Wilson (1985)) that step-children 
are in fact on average treated differently from biological children in households containing both: 
they receive less nourishment, and are likelier to be neglected or abused. We all know of 
individual cases of close and rewarding relationships between step-parents and step-children, and 
it is emphatically not our contention that all step-parents discriminate against step-children. 
However, on average parents favor their biological children. Even step-parents with the best 
intentions have to overcome the innate biological drive to favor their own kin. Daly and Wilson 
(1985) found using Canadian data that children living with a mother and a stepfather were 40 
times more likely to face child abuse than children living with both biological parents: in the vast 
majority of cases, abusive stepfathers never abused their own biological children. 
I now turn to evidence that apart from putative fathers, other kin (including grandparents) are 
also concerned about paternity uncertainty. Smith (1981) and Euler and Weitzel (1996) show 
matrilineal biases in grandparental solicitude: maternal grandparents are perceived (by their 
grandchildren) to be significantly more concerned about their welfare than paternal grandparents. 
The authors’ interpretation is that this happens because while maternal grandparents know that 
their grandchildren share their daughter’s genes, paternal grandparents are (consciously or sub-
consciously) influenced by paternity uncertainty and are more reluctant to invest in children who 
are possibly not kin. However, paternal grandparents become more solicitous as their distance 
from the children’s home decreases. Although the authors do not comment on this, this would be 
compatible with a framework where co-residence enables paternal grandparents to monitor their 
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daughter in law, bolstering the likelihood that their son is the father of the daughter-in-law’s 
children. High paternity confidence would then increase the paternal grandparents’ willingness to 
care for this grandchild. Sear, Mace and McGregor (2000) and Voland and Beise (2002) also 
document differences between maternal and paternal grandmothers’ solicitude.9 Gaulin, 
McBurney and Brakeman-Wartell (1997) have also shown that a matrilineal bias exists for aunts 
and uncles, with a mother’s siblings perceived to be significantly more solicitous on average than 
a father’s siblings. This reflects a similar propensity to invest in one’s kin: paternal relatives’ 
investments are affected by paternity uncertainty, but maternal relatives’ are not. Daly, Wilson 
and Weghorst (1982) in their account of the tendency of Naskapi-Montagnais men to invest in 
their sisters’ children mention that these men avoided investing in their brothers’ children 
because they were unsure of the true paternity of their brothers’ putative children. 
 
3. Basic Framework 
My model is an overlapping generations world where each generation lives for two periods. In 
the first period, an individual grows into adulthood, observes his parents’ decisions regarding 
bequests10 and residence patterns, marries, and chooses how much effort to supply on the initial 
capital (the family farm). Every one marries and each woman has one son and one daughter. In 
the second period, individuals bring up their children, decide on bequests and residence patterns 
(based partly on an identification of whether their son or their daughter has a comparative 
advantage in contributing to the family farm, given external conditions), and choose whether or 
not to monitor the sexual behavior of their daughter-in-law (if they live with their son and 
daughter-in-law) or of their daughter (if they live with their daughter and son-in-law). 
3.1 Utilities 
I denote gross utilities in the i-th period of life, i = 1,2, by Ui, and net utilities (gross utilities – 
costs) by ui. Those in the first period of life “the young” derive utility from the value of the 
family farm (which they may enhance as a result of their effort) and from the power to pass on 
                                                 
9 Among economists, Doepke and Tertilt (2009) have a model in which parents are altruistic. As men place a lower 
weight on their children’s utility than women, grandfathers place a lower weight on their sons’ children’s utility than 
on their daughters’ children’s (because they know their daughter’s children are more important to her than their 
son’s children are to him). In contrast, in my model the ability to pass on an asset to a genetic grandchild enters the 
grandparents’ utility function directly, even though parents are not altruistic in the sense of Doepke and Tertilt. 
10  More accurately, the young person observes announcements made by the parents on who is to inherit the family 
farm. There is no actual division of the farm as both generations continue to live on it. The timing of the bequest 
decision is discussed in a separate sub-section devoted to the timing of the game. 
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this family farm to their genetic descendants. Effort e is continuous, chosen from an interval [0, 
ě], and is costly. The disutility of choosing an effort level e is simply e. 
Assume that all parents give their adult child (or child’s spouse) an initial capital – whose 
value is normalized to V0 - to work with. For a given effort choice, all individuals of the same 
sex are equally productive. However, relative productivity across the sexes will vary depending 
on exogenous factors like population density and the nature of the threats of war faced by the 
society (as explained by  Boserup (1970) and Ember and Ember (1971) paraphrased earlier). Let 
such exogenous factors determine a variable d in the range [d,đ] where d ≤ d ≤ đ and increasing d 
denotes increasing population density and a move away from external war threats towards local 
or intermittent warfare. Thus a higher value of d means that men have more of an advantage over 
women in cultivation. The final value of the farm when a young person of sex j chooses effort e, 
given exogenous factors d, is Vj(e,d), Ve > 0, Vee< 0 (the value is increasing and concave in 
effort levels).Assume that an effort choice of zero adds no value : Vj(0,.) = V0. Hereafter I 
suppress the dependence on d barring cases where it is important.  
Individuals derive utility from the ability to pass on their asset – the family farm – to a 
genetic child. This ability is denoted by g. If an individual knows he or she will be unable to pass 
on this asset to their child – perhaps because the asset is willed not to this individual but to a 
sibling – g takes on a value of zero. In contrast, if an individual is certain that she can pass on 
this asset to a genetic child, g takes on its maximum value ĝ. If however the individual knows 
that the asset can be passed on to a child who is putatively his, but who may or may not be his 
genetic child – g takes on a value of pĝ, where 0 < p < 1. p is a reflection of the individual’s 
“paternity confidence” and takes the value p in the absence of any monitoring by the old. The 
old’s monitoring intensity c is also continuous, chosen from an interval [0, č]. For any choice of 
c, paternity confidence becomes p(c) where p’(c) > 0, p(0) = p, p(č) = 1. g will therefore be 
influenced by the older generation’s (endogenous) decision on how much to monitor, and on its  
bequest and residence decisions – denoted by b and R, both also endogenously determined. 
Given the discussion above, the utility of a young person of sex j, j = {m,f} is given by 
u1j = U1j(Vj(e, d), g(c, b, R)) – e                                      (1) 
The only exogenous variable in (1) is d. Suppressing the index j for the moment, U1 is increasing 
in both arguments at a diminishing rate and the two arguments are strategic complements, so that 
U11 > 0, U12 > 0, U111 < 0, U122 < 0, U112 > 0. Strategic complementarity implies that an individual 
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derives a higher utility from being able to add to the value of his asset if he is confident of 
passing on this high-value asset to his genetic heirs. We now state 
Assumption 1: argmax [U1j(., 0) – e] = 0. 
The utility a young individual gets if he or she is sure that the asset cannot be passed to his or her 
heirs is lower than the cost of incurring any positive effort.  
Also, we assume that U1j(V0, .) = 0 = u1j(V0, .) : if a young person exerts zero effort his gross 
and net utility are both zero (as is his “effort” cost). This assumption amounts to a choice of 
origin of the utility scale. 
Note that R can take on two values – P for patrilocality where the old live with their sons and 
daughters-in-law, while sending their daughters to live with their in-laws: and M for 
matrilocality. P is individually decided, whatever the social norm: individual elders may 
“deviate” (say, by trying to persuade a son-in-law to stay with them even in a patrilocal society). 
The bequest decision, b, involves choosing who inherits the family farm : we rule out 
“fractional” bequests, partly for simplicity, and partly because dividing the productive asset is 
undesirable (see Alexander (1974) for a discussion of how many societies sought to avoid 
division of the family farm so as not to make the farm inefficiently small) and may also be 
impractical (for example, if one sibling lives away from home, it may not be possible for her to 
regularly return home to cultivate her share of the farm). The farm itself can be willed to the son, 
the daughter or the son-in-law (in theory, also to the daughter-in-law, though we will show that 
this will never happen in our model). So b ε {S,D,SL,DL} and R ε{P,M}. 
What of the older generation’s utility? We assume that an individual of the older generation 
gets utility from an enhanced value to the family farm (resulting from the efforts of the adult 
child, or the child’s spouse), and from the knowledge that this farm will be inherited by a genetic 
grandchild. Monitoring (one’s daughter or daughter in law) is costly and a choice of monitoring 
intensity c entails a cost of c. The grandparents’ monitoring decision depends partly on their 
previous bequest and residence decisions, so c is a function of b and R. Our assumption that 
young men rely on the old to monitor their (the young men’s) spouses (which the old may or 
may not do) reflects the fact that the older generation, not being active in farm work, would have 
an advantage in monitoring the sexual behavior of young women in the household, while these 
women’s husbands may be too busy with work to do so themselves.  
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The component of the grandparent’s utility that depends on being able to pass on the farm to 
a genetic grandchild is denoted by G : G takes a (maximal) value of Ĝ if the grandparent is sure 
of being able to pass on the farm to a genetic grandchild, for instance, if the grandchild is a child 
of the grandparent’s daughter. If the grandparent is unsure of whether the “grandchild” is really a 
genetic descendant (which could be the case if the “grandchild” is the daughter-in-law’s child), 
G takes on a value of p(c)Ĝ if the grandparent is monitoring at intensity c, and p Ĝ if c = 0.  
The value of the family farm that obtains as a result of the effort choice of the grandparent’s 
adult child (or the child’s spouse) is influenced by the grandparent’s previous choices of b and R. 
R influences which child exerts the effort (we assume that a child who has migrated out of the 
household to live with his or her spouse cannot work on the family farm; a weaker assumption 
that he or she can supply effort but at a disadvantage would retain the spirit of our analysis but 
complicate it greatly). The bequest decision can influence how much effort this child chooses. 
Consider the case of a son who lives on the farm but knows that the farm is willed to his sister 
and will therefore not be passed on to his heirs: such a son would be less eager to exert effort 
relative to one who expects to be able to pass on the fruits of his efforts to his (genetic or at least 
putative) children. Thus the utility of a member of the older generation is given by 
u2 = U2(V(b, R, e, d), G(c)) – c(b, R)                                           (2) 
Only d is an exogenous parameter in (2). U2, like U1, is increasing in both arguments, and the 
two arguments are “strategic complements”: a high asset value is more attractive (relative to a 
low one) if the possibility of passing it on to a genetic grandchild is higher. We have U21 > 0, U22 
> 0, U212 > 0. Without loss of generality,  normalize U2(V0, .) = 0 for the utility an old person 
gets when the young do not exert any effort: for convenience, I designate this Assumption 2. 
Assumption 2: U2(V0, .) = 0 
3.2Timing 
The timing of the game is as follows. 
1. The old observe d, and identify which sex would be relatively more productive on the 
family farm. They then simultaneously decide on bequests, b and residence patterns, R. 
2. The young observe their parents’ decisions on b and R, then choose effort e: the old 
simultaneously choose c, the intensity with which they monitor the behavior of the young 
adult woman (daughter or daughter-in-law, depending on R) who co-resides with them. 
3. The old die, the young get old and steps 1 and 2 are repeated indefinitely. 
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Can the old alter their bequest decision (made before the young choose effort levels) after 
observing the effort choices of the young? If so, they could try to enforce the high effort level by 
threatening to reverse a favorable bequest if low effort were supplied by the legatee. However, 
this threat would not be subgame perfect. As the old have approached the end of their lives, they 
cannot gain by implementing the threat. And if reversing a prior bequest decision is even slightly 
costly, the old would only stand to lose by doing so [see Bruce and Waldman (1990) for a similar 
“finite period” argument made in a different context]. I therefore rule out this possibility and 
focus on the more interesting situation where effort is not strictly enforceable. 
In the appendix, I consider alternative assumptions about timing, specifically where the 
young observe the old’s monitoring decision before choosing effort. In this case, the old 
recognize that their monitoring influences the efforts of the young and take this into account a la 
Stackelberg while the text depicts a Nash equilibrium. Given weak restrictions on parameters, 
our results carry over for the Stackelberg case. 
 
4.  Solving the Model 
Solve the basic game laid out in the previous section by backward induction. First, focus on the 
stage where the young make effort choices while the old simultaneously decide on monitoring. 
4.1 Effort and Monitoring 
In this last stage of the game, we try to find a doublet (e*,c*) that is part of a Nash equilibrium : 
given e*, c* is the old’s optimal monitoring intensity, and given c*, e* must be the young’s 
optimal effort choice. First, consider the case where the young person supplying the effort is a 
male (the son or son-in-law). Suppressing d, such a male solves the maximization problem 
Max  U1m(Vm(e), p(c)ĝ) – e 
   e 
 
The first order condition with respect to e yields 
Vme U1m1(Vm(e), p(c) ĝ) = 1                                                            (3) 
If the male’s optimal effort choice is e*m, then e*m must satisfy (3) and therefore clearly e*m = 
e*m(c) : the optimal effort choice is a function of the level of monitoring chosen by the old.  
If the young person supplying effort is a female, she solves 
Max  U1f(Vf(e), ĝ) – e – κ(c) 
   e  
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where κ(c) is the disutility she faces if her parents or in-laws choose monitoring level c : κ(0) = 
0. As she faces no maternity uncertainty, she always has g = ĝ, unless she knows that she cannot 
pass on the asset to her heirs (perhaps because the asset is willed to her brother) in which case g  
= 0. Her first order condition with respect to e yields 
Vfe U1f1(Vf(e), ĝ) = 1                                                                 (4) 
Since (4) is independent of c, so will the female’s optimal effort choice e*f be, unlike the male’s. 
 Turning to the old’s monitoring decision, we have 
Proposition 1: If the parents have chosen b = D and R = M and daughters work the land, parents 
never monitor their daughter’s sexual behavior. 
Proof: From (4), the daughters’ effort choice is unaffected by the choice of c. Moreover, G = Ĝ 
even without monitoring in this case: as the farm will be inherited by the daughter’s children, the 
grandparents are certain of the farm being passed on to their genetic descendants. From (2), it is 
easy to see that the grandparents would optimally choose c = 0: given that monitoring is costly 
but influences neither effort nor G in this case, they choose not to monitor. Q.E.D 
 
 Thus when the daughter works the land, the doublet (e*f, 0) is part of a Nash equilibrium.  
Suppose now that there is a threshold value d* of the exogenous parameter d, such that for d < 
d*, women are the primary economic contributors while for d > d*, men are. 
Proposition 2 : If d < d*, parents always choose to retain their daughter on the farm rather than 
to “substitute” her labor by “importing” a daughter-in-law on to the farm. 
Proof : A daughter-in-law would be just as productive as a daughter, as members of the same 
sex share the same productivity. However, the old would now face the additional problem of a 
tradeoff: only if they monitor the daughter-in-law can they be sure that her child is their genetic 
descendant. Even if the daughter-in-law supplies as much effort as a daughter would (which 
would be the case if she expected her child to inherit), the old’s utility now becomes U2(Vf(e*f), 
p(c)Ĝ) – c < U2(Vf(e*f), Ĝ) (their utility when a daughter cultivates) as p(c)<1, c>0.   Q.E.D 
What monitoring level will the old choose if their son-in-law cultivates the land (and they 
live with their daughter and son-in-law)? When a son-in-law cultivates the land, the old’s best 
response to a given effort choice e*m is the solution to  
Max U2(Vm(e*m), Ĝ) – c 
 c                           
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As their daughter’s children will inherit, the grandparents are sure of being able to pass on the 
asset to their genetic heirs. Keeping the son-in-law’s effort fixed, therefore, the grandparents 
have no incentive to monitor: they optimally choose c = 0. The son-in-law, therefore, chooses 
e*m(0) in anticipation: this solves Vme U1m1(Vm(e*m(0)), pĝ) = 1. 
When a son cultivates the land (and the old live with their son and daughter-in-law), the old’s 
best response to a given effort choice e*m is the solution to  
Max U2(Vm(e*m), p(c)Ĝ) – c 
   c 
which yields the first order condition 
p’(c)ĜU22(Vm(e*m), p(c)Ĝ) = 1                                                  (5) 
Let C denote the value of c that solves (5). Thus when the son does the cultivation, the best-
response doublet is (e*m(C), C). 
Proposition 3: A son supplies more effort in a patrilocal system than a son-in-law in a matrilocal 
system. 
Proof: A son in a patrilocal system chooses e*m(C) while a son-in-law in a matrilocal system 
chooses e*m(0). By totally differentiating a young male’s first order condition, (3), we can check 
that optimal effort choice increases in c. Suppressing superscripts for notational convenience, 
total differentiation yields 
Vee(∂e/∂c)U1 + Ve[U11(∂e/∂c) + p’(c)ĝU12] = 0 
Or 
(∂e/∂c)=-[ p’(c)ĝU12 Ve]/[ VeU11 + Vee U1] > 0 
given U11 < 0,  Vee < 0, Ve > 0, U1 > 0, U12 > 0, p’(c) > 0. 
Thus, a son optimally supplies greater effort than a son-in-law. Q.E.D. 
 Proposition 3 highlights a fundamental misalignment of incentives between the parents-
in-law and their son-in-law in matrilocality. The latter supplies low effort, correctly anticipating 
that his parents-in-law do not care about his paternity uncertainty (being sure of being able to 
pass on the farm to their genetic grandchild whether or not the son in law is the real father of this 
grandchild) and therefore will not monitor his wife (their daughter).  
One may argue that parents in law worry about the effect of their lack of monitoring on 
the work incentives of the son-in-law, and increase their monitoring strategically in response. A 
Stackelberg equilibrium is a more appropriate solution concept than Nash in such a case. I take 
this into account in the appendix and show that under weak parameter restrictions Proposition 3 
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still holds. Maternal grandparents who want their son in law to cultivate will now do some 
monitoring, but less than what the son’s own parents would have provided. Therefore, sons in 
patrilocality would still supply more effort than sons in law in matrilocality. 
Next we turn to the first-stage choice of bequests and residence patterns by the old and 
fully characterize equilibria. 
4.2 Bequests, Residence and Equilibrium 
I hypothesize that two different equilibria obtain – each for different parameter ranges – and  
derive conditions supporting each type of equilibrium.  
Definition : For the purposes of the model, an equilibrium is a set φ of five elements 
{R*,b*,W*,c*,e*} – where R*, b* and c* represent the old’s decisions regarding residence, 
bequest recipient and monitoring respectively, W* indicates the identity of the young person 
(son, daughter, son-in-law or daughter-in-law) who actually works on the land11, and e* indicates 
this young person’s effort choice – such that  
(a) c* and e* are best responses to each other. 
(b) Given b*, the old cannot increase their utility by deviating from R* to R ≠ R*. 
(c) Given R*, the old cannot increase their utility by deviating from b* to b ≠ b*. 
(d) Given b* and R*, the old cannot increase their utility by deviating from W* to W ≠ W*. 
(e) Given that all other households have chosen φ, no one old couple can gain by 
simultaneously switching b and R. 
Focus first on an MME, with women working the land and with no monitoring. This 
equilibrium may be denoted φ ={M,D,D,0, e*f }. We suppose that d < d*: exogenous parameters 
like population density and the state of warfare are such that women are relatively more effective 
than men at working on the land. 
From the previous sub-section, we already know that the doublet (c*,e*)=(0, e*f) is part of an 
MME. Therefore, requirement (a) for an equilibrium is fulfilled: the old cannot gain by 
monitoring their daughter and she cannot gain by varying her effort choice. The utility of the old 
in the proposed equilibrium is U2(Vf(e*f), Ĝ) while the utility of the daughter is U1f(Vf(e*f), ĝ) - 
e*f  . Consider the decision pair {b,R}={D,M}. When will there be no profitable deviations from 
this decision pair (so that conditions (b) and (c) are met)?  
                                                 
11 Note that because of the assumption that a non co-residing young person cannot work the land, W* cannot be 
independent of R*. However, if for example R* = M, W* could either be the daughter or the son-in-law and 
conversely for a patrilocal living arrangement. 
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Consider what happens when the old bequeath to their daughter, but decide on a patrilocal 
residence pattern, sending the daughter to her in-laws while retaining their son on the farm – a 
deviation from R* = M to R = P. As the daughter does not live with her parents, she cannot work 
on the land: the parents must depend on their son for this. However, the son now knows that his 
efforts will not benefit his heirs, as the farm is willed to his sister: for him g = 0. Assumption 1 
ensures that the son will then supply zero effort. The utility of his parents falls to U2(V0, .) = 0 < 
U2(Vf(e*f), Ĝ) (using Assumption 2). Therefore this deviation is unprofitable. 
We may ask if this deviation would still remain unprofitable if the old entrusted cultivation to 
their son’s wife rather than to their son, especially given that women appear to have an 
advantage in cultivation as d < d*. However, her incentives would be the same as the son’s, as 
she cannot bequeath to her children. Even were this not so, Proposition 2 has already established 
that parents can never gain by “substituting” a daughter-in-law’s labor for a daughter’s. 
Now consider what happens when the old keep the residence pattern fixed, continuing to live 
with their daughter and son-in-law, but vary the bequest recipient – no longer giving the bequest 
to their daughter. First consider the case where the bequest is given to the son – a deviation from 
b* = D to b = S. The land however must be cultivated by the daughter, as she is the co-resident 
sibling. Now, g = 0 for the daughter as she knows that the fruits of her effort will not be passed 
on to her heirs: given Assumption 1, she supplies zero effort. This would lower her parents’ 
utility to U2(V0, .) = 0 < U2(Vf(e*f), Ĝ). Therefore this deviation is unprofitable. An identical 
analysis would obtain if the bequest recipient were the son’s wife. 
We now consider the deviation where the residence pattern remains matrilocal, but the son-
in-law is asked to work on the land instead of the daughter. It will make no difference to the son-
in-law’s incentives whether the legatee in this case is the daughter or the son-in-law: in either 
case his putative children inherit. This therefore covers both the case where there is a deviation 
from b* = D to b* = SL given R* = M, and the case where b and R remain unchanged at {D,M} 
respectively but W changes from W* = D to W = SL (note that this is the only feasible deviation 
in W given R is unchanged at M). As already shown, the parents-in-law will not monitor their 
daughter, the son-in-law anticipates this and supplies low effort, e*m(0) . The parents-in-law 
must therefore suffer the consequences: their utility is now U2(Vm(e*m(0), Ĝ) (G remains at Ĝ as 
the grandparents are sure of their genetic connection with their maternal grandchild, who will 
inherit).  Their utility from this deviation is less than U2(Vf(e*f), Ĝ) provided 
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Vm(e*m(0)) < Vf(e*f)                                                         (6) 
(6) states that a man supplying low effort is less productive than a woman supplying high effort. 
This seems eminently likely, particularly in parameter ranges where women have an advantage 
(d < d*). Thus conditions (3), (4) and (6), together with Assumptions 1 and 2, satisfy 
requirements (a),(b), (c) and (d) for an equilibrium. Only requirement (e) remains to be checed. 
Proposition 4 : If all old couples are in MME, with daughters working the land and no 
monitoring, no couple can gain by persuading their daughter-in-law to live with them and 
cultivate their land while simultaneously nominating her as legatee. 
Proof :  From Proposition 2, a single couple can never gain by such a simultaneous switch of 
bequest and residence arrangements:  if they did, they would either have to monitor the daughter-
in-law’s behavior, which is costly, or suffer the uncertainty of not knowing whether the 
grandchild who inherits the farm is genetically related to them. QED. 
From Proposition 4, we can see that a single old couple cannot benefit from a simultaneous 
switch in b and R from {b,R} = {D,M} to {b,R} = {DL,P}. The other possible simultaneous 
switch we have to consider would be to {S, P} – involving a single old couple in a matrilocal 
society persuading their son to live with them and work on the land, while nominating him as 
legatee. When would such a switch be unprofitable? There are two ways in which this switch 
could happen: first, the parents might only persuade the son to come and reside with them, but be 
content to leave the daughter-in-law in her dotal home.  With this option, the parents would save 
the cost of monitoring their daughter-in-law, but would run the risk that their son’s putative 
children (and heirs) may not genuinely be his.  The son would supply low effort, e*m(0),while G 
for his parents would take the value pĜ. Thus his parents’ utility U2(Vm(e*m(0)), pĜ) < 
U2(Vm(e*m(0)), Ĝ) < U2(Vf(e*f), Ĝ) (this implied by (6)). The deviation will not be profitable. 
     The parents’ other option would be to induce both their son and their daughter-in-law to live 
with them and get the son to cultivate the land while nominating him as their legatee. The son 
would choose e*m(C) in the (correct) expectation that his parents monitor his wife at intensity C,  
raising G to p(C)Ĝ. However, now we must consider an additional factor. As the daughter-in-law 
is residing with her parents-in-law, she can no longer supply labor on her own parents’ farm, 
unlike other daughters in a matrilocal equilibrium. Therefore, her parents lose the value of her 
labor and must be compensated for this by her in-laws. If compensating for this loss cancels out 
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any gain that the in-laws derive from substituting their son’s labor for their daughter’s, such a 
deviation will never take place. For this, we require that for d in the relevant range (d <d*), 
U2(Vm(e*m(C)), p(C)Ĝ) – C - U2(Vf(e*f), Ĝ) < U2(Vf(e*f), Ĝ)                             (7) 
The right hand side of (7) shows the minimum compensation that must be paid to the 
daughter-in-law’s parents to persuade them to part with her labor (recall that by Assumption 2 
their utility falls to zero if no effort is supplied on their land). The left hand side shows the gain 
that the son’s parents could make by persuading both the son and daughter-in-law to reside with 
them, and having the son work their land. Their utility would be U2(Vm(e*m(C)), p(C)Ĝ) – C, 
from which we subtract their utility in the matrilocal equilibrium. Note that if the left hand side is 
negative (7) will be automatically satisfied (in this case the deviation would be unprofitable even 
if there were no need to compensate the daughter-in-law’s family). Rearranging (7) and 
emphasizing the dependence on d, we have 
U2(Vm(e*m(C),d), p(C)Ĝ) – C < 2 U2(Vf(e*f,d), Ĝ) for all d < d*                       (8) 
 
We have therefore shown that subject to (3),(4),(6), (8) and Assumptions 1 and 2, our 
candidate MME, φ = {M,D,D,0, e*f }, can be supported if it exists.  
Proposition 5 : If condition (6) holds for all d, then we can never have an equilibrium with 
{b*,R*,W*,c*,e*} = {SL,M,SL,0, e*m(0)} or {D,M,SL,0, e*m(0)}. 
Proof : Such an equilibrium involves matrilocality with sons-in-law working the land, while the 
legatee may be either the daughter or the son-in-law (either way the son-in-law would expect his 
putative heirs to inherit). However, we have seen that in the last stage of the game we would 
have c* = 0, e* = e*m(0). This would give the old an utility of U2(Vm(e*m(0)), Ĝ) : while sure of 
being able to pass on their land to a genetic heir, they suffer because the son-in-law shirks.  If the 
old couple deviated by asking their daughter to work the land (switching from W* = SL to W* = 
D) by (4) the daughter supplies e*f; the parents get a utility  U2(Vf(e*f), Ĝ)> U2(Vm(e*m(0)), Ĝ) 
as long as (6) holds. Thus, a profitable deviation exists and the equilibrium breaks down. Q.E.D 
We now discuss the conditions needed to support another candidate equilibrium – a PPE 
with sons working the land and their parents monitoring daughters-in-law. This candidate 
equilibrium φ = {P,S,S,C, e*m(C)}. We suppose that d > d*: exogenous parameters make men 
are relatively more effective than women at working on the land. This implies that for a given d, 
we cannot have both a MME and a PPE. The reason is that the old can choose the equilibrium 
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that gives them higher utility: which one does so depends on the value of d. In this candidate 
PPE, the old get a utility of U2(Vm(e*m(C)), p(C)Ĝ) - C. If this is indeed supportable as an 
equilibrium, every old couple would choose to focus on it rather than on our MME if d is such 
that their equilibrium payoff is higher in the PPE. This will happen iff 
U2(Vm(e*m(C),d), p(C)Ĝ) – C ≥ U2(Vf(e*f,d), Ĝ)                                          (9) 
d* is the value of d for which (9) holds as an equality. (9) holds as a strict inequality for d > 
d* as by construction higher values of d tend to raise Vm relative to Vf.  Thus, the PPE is chosen 
for d ≥ d* (we assume that it is chosen in the knife-edge case d = d*), the MME for d < d*. 
What conditions are required to support a PPE? We already know that (e*,c*) = (e*m(C),C) are 
best responses to each other hence requirement (a) of an equilibrium is met. 
We now turn to requirements (b), (c) and (d). First consider a deviation from R* = P to R = 
M with b* fixed at S. The old bequeath to their son but send him away to his wife’s family while 
retaining their daughter (and possibly their son-in-law) on the farm. Now, the son cannot 
cultivate the land . Cultivation is left to the daughter or son-in-law who know that their heirs will 
not benefit.  So by Assumption 1 they choose zero effort. By assumption 2, this lowers the utility 
of the old from U2(Vm(e*m(C)), p(C)Ĝ) - C to 0 – an unprofitable deviation. 
Other possible deviations involve sticking to patrilocality (R* = P) but varying the legatee. If 
the land is willed to the daughter or the son-in-law, then by an argument identical to the one 
above, the son will exert zero effort on the land, his parents get zero utility, making this deviation 
unprofitable. The parents cannot improve their utility by willing the land to their daughter-in-law 
rather than to their son, with all other variables unchanged: the son’s incentives are not affected 
as long as his heirs can inherit.  What if the parents varied W from W* = S to W* = DL? That is, 
they ask their daughter-in-law, instead of their son, to work the land. Note that this is the only 
permissible deviation in W: the daughter or son-in-law cannot work the land in a patrilocal 
system This deviation in W may, but need not, be accompanied by a shift in bequest from the son 
to his wife. In either case, the daughter-in-law would have incentives to exert an effort of e*f. 
Meanwhile, the old would get U2(Vf(e*f), p(c)Ĝ) – c as they need to monitor the daughter-in-law 
or face the fact of paternity uncertainty. However, by (9), a PPE exists only for those values of d 
for which U2(Vm(e*m(C)), p(C)Ĝ) - C ≥ U2(Vf(e*f), Ĝ). But U2(Vf(e*f), Ĝ) > U2(Vf(e*f), p(c)Ĝ) – 
c as c>0, p(c)<1 for all c . Therefore, given (9),  U2(Vm(e*m(C)), p(C)Ĝ) - C > U2(Vf(e*f), p(c)Ĝ) 
– c for all possible c . Thus this deviation is unprofitable.  
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Therefore, we can see that conditions (3),(5),(9) and Assumptions 1 and 2 can support 
requirements (a),(b),(c),and (d) of a PPE. We now turn to requirement (e) – a single old couple 
must not be able to benefit by switching both b and R away from {b*, R*} = {S, P} when others 
are locked in a PPE. What if a single couple persuaded their daughter and son-in-law to live with 
them while naming one of them as legatee? First, we see that this could only make sense if the 
couple also wishes the daughter or son-in-law to work the land : if they rely on their son or 
daughter in law to do so, zero effort will be supplied as the son’s (putative) heirs will no longer 
inherit. We first consider the case where the couple wants their daughter to work on the land. 
With this, the couple can get a payoff of U2(Vf(e*f), Ĝ). However, by (9), for the relevant range 
of d (d>d*), U2(Vf(e*f), Ĝ) ≤  U2(Vm(e*m(C)), p(C)Ĝ) - C : so this deviation is not profitable. 
What about the case where the couple wants to substitute their son-in-law’s labor for their 
son’s? In this case, the son-in-law would supply low effort e*m(0), correctly anticipating that his 
parents-in-law would not monitor their daughter. The parents-in-law, however, would have to 
compensate the son-in-law’s parents, who lose the value of their son’s output when he no longer 
lives with them. This deviation will be unprofitable when the minimum compensation that has to 
be paid to the son-in-law’s parents outweighs the gain from “hiring” the son-in-law, ie, when 
U2(Vm(e*m(0)), Ĝ) - [U2(Vm(e*m(C)), p(C)Ĝ) – C] ≤ U2(Vm(e*m(C)), p(C)Ĝ) - C       (10) 
The right hand side of (10) shows the minimum compensation that has to be paid to the son-
in-law’s parents – using Assumption 2, their utility falls to zero when zero effort is exerted on 
their farm (due to their son leaving) – while in his presence they would have obtained their PPE  
utility of U2(Vm(e*m(C)), p(C)Ĝ) - C. The left hand side shows the gain from substituting a son-
in-law’s labor for a son’s. There may be a gain because while the son-in-law supplies lower 
effort, the parents do not monitor their daughter, saving on monitoring costs, as they are sure that 
her children are really their genetic heirs. In contrast, they would have had to monitor their son’s 
wife if the son’s putative heirs were to inherit. Rearranging (10), we get  
U2(Vm(e*m(0)), Ĝ) ≤ 2[U2(Vm(e*m(C)), p(C)Ĝ) - C]                                        (11) 
I can now state my two main results. 
Result 1: A PPE with φ = {P,S,S,C, e*m(C)} – a patrilocal-patrilineal equilibrium where 
sons work the land, supplying high effort while their parents monitor their daughters-in-law – 
exists subject to conditions (9), (11), (3),(5) and Assumptions 1 and 2.  
 24
Result 2 : An MME with φ = {M,D,D,0, e*f}- a matrilocal-matrilineal equilibrium where 
daughters work the land, supplying high effort while their parents do not monitor them – exists 
when condition (9) does not hold, while conditions (3),(4),(6), and Assumptions 1 and 2 do (note 
that (8) is automatically satisfied whenever (9) is not). 
Corollary 1 : PPE and MME do not coexist for a given value of d. 
Proposition 6 : If conditions are such that either a PPE or an MME can be supported, an 
equilibrium where daughters-in-law work the land will not exist. 
Proof : If such an equilibrium exists, the payoff that the parents-in-law get is U2(Vf(e*f), p(c)Ĝ) 
– c < U2(Vf(e*f), Ĝ), the equilibrium payoff in our MME, for all c. If (9) does not hold, the MME 
equilibrium exists – given that the other conditions supporting it are in force - and will always be 
chosen over an equilibrium where daughters-in-law work the land. If condition (9) does hold, a 
PPE exists – given that the other conditions supporting it are in force – and yields the old an 
equilibrium payoff of U2(Vm(e*m(C)), p(C)Ĝ) – C ≥ U2(Vf(e*f), Ĝ)  > U2(Vf(e*f), p(c)Ĝ) – c  ; so 
it will be chosen over an equilibrium where daughters-in-law work the land. 
 
5. Discussion 
The model shows how residence and inheritance patterns reinforce each other. Patrilineality, 
for instance, enhances the importance of ensuring that a putative heir is truly a genetic 
descendant – thereby enhancing the need to have patrilocality as a monitoring mechanism. 
Patrilocality, in turn, results in the need to sustain the incentives of a son to exert effort on the 
land (since he is the sibling who lives with his parents) – emphasizing the roles both of 
patrilineal bequests and of monitoring. Similarly, with a matrilineal system, establishing a child’s 
paternity is less vital – especially if the woman is the prime economic contributor, in which case 
a son-in-law’s co-operation is not of primary importance. This fits in perfectly with a matrilocal 
living arrangement: matrilocality in turn emphasizes the need to sustain the daughter’s 
incentives, but not the son’s or even the son-in-law’s: thus monitoring is not needed. The fact 
that patrilocal-patrilineal arrangements were more common than matrilocal-matrilineal ones 
would reflect the fact that men were relatively more productive on the family farm under a wider 
set of exogenous conditions: in terms of the model, condition (9) was relatively likely to hold. 
My analysis does not apply to nomadic societies, or to societies with shifting cultivation or 
collective property arrangements. In such societies, land is not a heritable asset; so the need to 
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sustain a young person’s incentives to work on the farm vanishes (Botticini and Siow (2003) 
similarly qualify the applicability of their model). This was true of a number of primarily 
polygynous African societies. Our model abstracts from polygyny – partly in the interests of 
tractability: however, most societies where polygyny was widespread were also societies where 
cultivation was not sedentary. Therefore, my model would in any case not apply to them. 
I do not claim that the need to monitor a wife in the presence of paternity uncertainty is the 
only possible reason for the emergence of patrilocality. However, the connection between 
inheritance, residence patterns and paternity confidence mentioned in Section 2 (numbers are 
presented in Appendix Table 1) is suggestive, and this connection is made explicit in my model. 
I have aimed to develop a plausible model where parents and grandparents care about passing on 
assets to genetic heirs (note however that even if uncertain about paternity, they derive more 
utility from passing on assets to even putative children). Moreover, as section 2.2 shows, 
paternity uncertainty continues to motivate modern men. Many societies – particularly western 
ones – have broken away from the extended family pattern, now that children no longer inherit 
their parents’ occupations and can move beyond the family farm. In these societies, paternal kin 
can no longer play the role of “monitors”. Men however must still confront a degree of paternity 
uncertainty and as discussed, their investment decisions in their putative offspring would then 
respond to subconscious cues of shared genes, such as facial resemblance. 
A working paper version has an alternative model with no paternity uncertainty. In that 
model, both the young and old assume automatic fidelity and act as if any child of the wife’s is 
undoubtedly also her husband’s. To explain the emergence of a PPE in some circumstances and 
an MME in others, we would then need the Rosenzweig-Wolpin assumption: that “insiders” 
raised on a farm since childhood have a productivity advantage over outsiders: sons, for instance, 
over sons-in-law, for instance. Such an assumption is unnecessary for my main model. 
 
6. Conclusion : Back to Juvenal 
The quotation with which I begin this paper is from the first-century Roman poet and satirist, 
Juvenal. Translated, the question asks “Who will guard the guardians?” Juvenal was referring to 
the need to guard one’s wife from “immoral behavior”. He goes on to say  
I know the plan that my friends always advise me to adopt : “Bolt her in, constrain her!” But who can 
watch the watchmen?   
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My model represents a partial solution to Juvenal’s problem. In patrilocal-patrilineal 
societies, patrilocality functioned as a monitoring device: paternal grandparents and putative 
fathers shared a common interest in ensuring that any child born to a wife was not sired by an 
outsider. The grandparents would be the “guards” –guards who would not be easy to sway, as 
their self-interest coincided with their son’s.  In matrilocal-matrilineal societies, however, young 
men – sons-in-law residing with their wives’ families – would face precisely Juvenal’s problem.  
They could not credibly rely on maternal grandparents to monitor the behavior of their daughters 
(the young men’s wives): the ostensible “guardians” did not do their job, and there was no one to 
watch over them! 
  
Appendix A: Stackelberg 
Here, the only change from the text model is that the young observe the old’s choice of c 
before choosing e. The analysis for daughters (section 4.1 and Propositions 1 and 2) is unaffected 
– if daughters cultivate, parents do not monitor. However, now the old choose c knowing that it 
affects young men’s e. Thus when a son in law cultivates, the old will choose c to solve 
Max U2(Vm(e*m(c)), Ĝ) – c 
 c                           
which yields the first order condition 
Ve(∂e/∂c) U21(Vm(e), Ĝ) = 1                                                   (A1) 
where subscripts denote derivatives. The RHS of (A1) denotes the marginal cost of monitoring 
while the LHS denotes the marginal benefit of monitoring in terms of the son in law’s production 
incentives. Let c be the solution of (A1), corresponding to which the son in law chooses an effort 
of e*m(c). By the second order maximization condition, the marginal benefit of monitoring must 
be decreasing in c. 
 When a son cultivates, the old have an added incentive to monitor as they care about the 
likelihood that the son is the real father of their putative grandchild. They now solve 
Max U2(Vm(e*m(c)), p(c)Ĝ) – c 
 c                           
which yields the first order condition 
p’(c)ĜU22+Ve(∂e/∂c) U21(Vm(e), p(c)Ĝ) = 1                                (A2) 
Again, the LHS of (A2) represents the marginal benefit of monitoring. The marginal cost in (A1) 
and (A2) is the same. Moreover, the marginal benefit is decreasing in c by the second order 
condition. Therefore, if the marginal benefit in (A2), evaluated at c, is greater than the marginal 
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benefit in (A1), then the value of c which solves (A2) must necessarily be greater than c. 
Therefore, for grandparents to monitor more when a son cultivates than when a son in law does 
so, it suffices to work out under what restrictions the LHS of (A2) exceeds the LHS of (A1), 
when both are evaluated at c. We now have the parallel to Proposition 3 in the Nash case: 
Proposition 3’: Sons in patrilocality supply more effort than sons in law in matrilocality 
provided the old’s marginal utility from a higher value of land and from a genetic grandchild are 
high relative to the complementarity between these two components of their utility, specifically, if 
  U21U22 / U212  >(1-p(c))/p’(c). 
Proof: As argued above, the old will supply greater monitoring for a son than for a son in law if 
the LHS of (A2) exceeds the LHS of (A1), both evaluated at c. Using the fact that U21(Vm(e(c)), 
Ĝ)- U21(Vm(e(c)), p(c)Ĝ)= (1-p(c)) Ĝ U212 , this amounts to 
p’(c)ĜU22 > Ve(∂e/∂c) (1-p(c)) Ĝ U212=(1-p(c)) Ĝ U212/ U21 
where the equality follows directly from (A1), or 
U21U22 / U212  >(1-p(c))/p’(c).                                                (A3) 
Thus the old monitor supply greater monitoring (call it C) when a son cultivates than when a son 
in law does so. Since (∂e/∂c)>0 as shown in the proof of Proposition 3 in the text, this means that 
e*m(c)< e*m(C) so that sons in patrilocality work harder than sons in law in matrilocality.   QED 
Intuitively, when a son cultivates, his parents have a strong incentive to monitor both 
because the increase in the son’s paternity confidence directly increases their utility (captured by 
U22) and because this monitoring increases the son’s productive incentives (captured by U21). 
The only dampening factor is the cross derivative term U212 which captures the fact that as long 
as monitoring does not result in a paternity confidence of 1, the grandparents may care less about 
the son’s increased productivity as it is not certain that the grandchild inheriting this productive 
asset will be their genetic grandchild. However, this is a second order effect of monitoring while 
the direct effects on the two arguments of the utility function are first order effects. Therefore, 
(A3) is a reasonable restriction and we restrict ourselves to the domain where it holds. 
 The rest of the analysis follows the Nash case with the difference that off-equilibrium 
scenarios which involve cultivation by the son in law now involve the grandparents supplying 
monitoring of c < C instead of 0 and the son in law supplying an effort of e*m(c) instead of 
e*m(0). Therefore, e*m(c) replaces e*m(0) in conditions (6) and (11) in the text. 
 
 28
Appendix B :Appendix Table 1 
This table is based on Table 2 in Gaulin and Schlegel (1980). I group patrilocal and virilocal 
societies together (the two are separate categories in Gaulin and Schlegel). I also group 
matrilocal, uxorilocal and avunculocal societies (these last involve living with matrilineal 
kinsmen, usually uncles) together. 
Appendix Table 1 : degree of paternity confidence and residence patterns 
 Low paternity confidence High paternity confidence 
Patrilocal/virilocal 34 51 
Matrilocal/uxorilocal/avunculocal 18 7 
 
Source : Author’s calculations from Table 2 of Gaulin and Schlegel (1980) , page 305. 
Thus the majority of mother-centered residence patterns entailed low degrees of paternity 
confidence, while the majority of father-centered residence patterns entailed high paternity 
confidence. Readers are referred to the original table for chi-square and p statistics. 
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